“No one who fought there, on either side, talked seriously about who won and who lost. In such a slaughterhouse there are no winners, only survivors.” (An American soldier after the Battle of Ia Drang)

The Vietnam War could have been called a comedy of errors if the consequences weren’t so deadly and tragic. In 1951, while war was raging in Korea, the United States began signing defense pacts with nations in the Pacific, intending to create alliances that would contain the spread of Communism. As the Korean War was winding down, America joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, pledging to defend several nations in the region from Communist aggression. One of those nations was South Vietnam.

Before the Vietnam War, most Americans would have been hard pressed to locate Vietnam on a map. South Vietnamese President Diệm’s regime was extremely unpopular, and war broke out between Communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam around the end of the 1950s. Kennedy’s administration tried to prop up the South Vietnamese with training and assistance, but the South Vietnamese military was feeble. A month before his death, Kennedy signed a presidential directive withdrawing 1,000 American personnel, but shortly after Kennedy’s assassination, new President Lyndon B. Johnson reversed course, instead opting to expand American assistance to South Vietnam.

At the start of hostilities, the United States hoped to batter the North Vietnamese into submission with Operation Rolling Thunder in early 1965, but it was hamstrung by some of the most restrictive rules of engagement ever imposed on a military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to fight the war to win, smashing North Vietnam’s military capabilities by unleashing the full weight of America’s excellent air arm against Ho Chi Minh’s resources. President Lyndon Johnson, however, had other ideas. His policy revolved around fear of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the war, though a considerable body of intelligence suggested neither would likely intervene. The North Vietnamese accepted Chinese aid but viewed their large neighbor with extreme suspicion bordering on hostility. The Soviets, for their part, did not work well with the Chinese either, and they endured internal problems of their own at the time.

Later in 1965, the government decided to divert many air assets to supporting a bigger American ground presence in South Vietnam. Admiral U.S.G. Sharp noted, “Our Rolling Thunder bombing program against North Vietnam got off to a painfully slow start and inched along in the most gradual increase in intensity. At the same time we decided to employ additional ground forces in South Vietnam and use them in active combat operations against the enemy.”

Thus, the fighting in the la Drang Valley represented the first significant encounters between American soldiers and the North Vietnamese. Fought in November 1965 as a part of the Pleiku campaign in Vietnam’s Central Highlands, these battles were most notable at the time for involving large-scale helicopter assaults supported by B-52 strategic bombers playing tactical support roles. They also established a model for the war in Vietnam in which the Americans made use of rapid air mobility, reliance on artillery, and close air support, while the North Vietnamese attempted to engage their enemy at close range with the objective of neutralizing their firepower. But it would also serve as a harbinger of what was to come, as tactical successes would not bring about strategic advantages for the Americans. In fact, both sides would claim victory by the time fighting was done around Ia Drang.